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LISTING OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the parties to the action in the District Court below 
are listed as follows: 
Plaintiff: 
Surety Life Insurance Company, a Utah corporation. 
Defendants: 
Melvin K. Burningham, Howard H. Hucks and Markwest 
Corporation, a California corporation. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
STEPHEN W. RUPP, TRUSTEE, 
as successor in interest to 
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 890594-CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this case is vested in this Court pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rules 3 and 42 (1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying 
appellee Melvin K. Burningham's motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the summary judgment entered 
against him. 
2) Whether the trial court erred in denying Melvin K. 
Burningham's motion to set aside the summary judgment on grounds 
that genuine issues of material fact exist. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1) The trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on 
a motion to set aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and is subject to reversal only where a clear 
1 
abuse of discretion is shown. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 
1994 (Utah 1984); Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen, 166 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 58, 59 (Ct. App. 1991). Where the issue under Rule 60(b) is 
whether a judgment is void, the trial court's decision not to 
vacate becomes a question of law upon which no deference is given 
to the trial court. State Pep't of Social Servs. v. Vijil, 784 
P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989); Van Per Stappen, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
59. 
2) Where the issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in denying a motion to set aside the summary judgment on 
grounds that issues of fact exist, Utah appellate courts apply "the 
same standard incumbent on the trial court: the grant of such a 
motion (or affirmance thereof) is appropriate only where there 
exist no genuine issues of fact relevant to the disposition of the 
claim underlying the motion." Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794, 797 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting L & A Prywall, Inc. v. Whitmore 
Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1980)). 
The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue 
of material fact is, of course, on the moving party. See, e.g., 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). However, once the 
moving party has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the 
non-moving party to designate "specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.x It is 
essential to note that the non-moving party in summary judgment 
1The Utah Court of Appeals has expressly approved of and 
adopted the United States Supreme Court's approach to summary 
judgment set out in Celotex. See, e.g., Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceu-
tical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
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"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 
doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The central inquiry 
is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to 
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one 
party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
The nature of this appeal is straightforward: Melvin K. 
Burningham ("Burningham") appeals the trial court's order denying 
his motion to vacate or set aside the summary judgment. (See June 
12, 1989 Order, attached as Addendum No. 1.) However, Burningham 
inappropriately addresses issues and makes arguments in his 
appellate brief on behalf of the other defendants, Markwest 
Corporation ("Markwest") and Howard H. Hucks ("Hucks"), president 
of Markwest. Neither Markwest nor Hucks appealed the same trial 
court's order denying their various motions. Only Burningham 
appealed the trial court's order. (See Notice of Appeal, R. 344.) 
In an order signed by Judge Gregory K. Orme on August 5, 1991, 
the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that Burningham was the only 
defendant to have appealed the trial court's order. (See August 5, 
1991 Utah Court of Appeals Order, p. 1, attached as Addendum No. 
2.) The same order also determined that because Burningham filed 
a bankruptcy petition after he appealed the trial court's order, 
trustee Stephen W. Rupp would be substituted as the appellant for 
Burningham. This matter was thereafter styled as follows: "Surety 
3 
Life Insurance Company, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Stephen W. Rupp, 
Trustee, as successor in interest to Melvin K. Burningham, 
Defendant and Appellant." (See Addendum No. 2.) 
II. Course of Proceedings/Relevant Facts 
Although the issues and the nature of this case are relatively 
simple, the record of the proceedings below in comparison is 
unfortunately long and convoluted. As evidenced in Burninghamfs 
brief, Burningham and the other defendants have filed an avalanche 
of pleadings. Surety Life undertakes herein to present with 
clarity the course of proceedings in this case and the relevant 
facts for this Court's review. 
On or about January 9, 1987, Burningham and Markwest executed 
a promissory notes and trust deed in the sum of $1,000,000 payable 
to appellee Surety Life. (R. 7-35). This loan was for permanent 
financing of a recreational vehicle and commercial storage project 
("Draper Project") Markwest was developing on property located in 
Draper, Utah. The trust deed covered the Draper property, which 
Burningham refers to in his brief as the "Draper R.V. & Commercial 
Park." 
Burningham, Markwest and Hucks also executed a guaranty 
agreement which unconditionally guaranteed repayment of all sums 
payable under the promissory note. (Attached as Addendum No. 3.) 
The terms of the guaranty agreement provide for a waiver of 
defenses and consent to the entry of judgment. The agreement 
states, in pertinent part, the following: 
[The Guarantors] [acknowledge and agree 
that the Beneficiary [Surety Life] may pursue 
its rights and remedies under this Agreement 
notwithstanding any other guaranty of or 
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security for the indebtedness evidenced by the 
Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan 
Documents. The Guarantors authorize the 
Beneficiary, at its sole option, without 
notice or demand and without affecting the 
liability of the Guarantors under this Agree-
ment, to foreclose the Deed of Trust and the 
interests in real property secured thereby 
judicial or nonjudicial sale, and the Guaran-
tors hereby waive any defense to the recovery 
against Guarantors of any deficiency after a 
non-judicial sale . . . . 
(See Addendum No. 3, 1f 6. ) 
Surety Life was not involved in any way in the development or 
additional financing of the Draper Project. Markwest later 
obtained construction financing for the Draper project from United 
Savings & Loan Association ("United Savings"). Surety Life had no 
involvement or connection whatsoever with United Savingsf role in 
the financing and management of the Draper Project. (See Statement 
of Facts in Surety Life's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss Complaint, attached as Addendum No. 4.) 
When Burningham, Markwest and Hucks failed to pay the amounts 
due under the promissory note, Surety Life foreclosed on the Draper 
property securing the note and noticed a trustee's sale for 
February 1, 1988. On the day of the scheduled trustee's sale, 
Draper RV & Commercial Storage, Melvin K. Burningham and his son, 
Wayne Burningham ("plaintiffs"), filed a complaint against Surety 
Life and United Savings and simultaneously filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order to block the trustee's sale. The court 
issued the temporary restraining order that morning. Plaintiffs' 
complaint against Surety Life and United Savings was based on a 
"lender liability" theory that United Savings had taken over the 
project and operated it improperly. (See Transcript of Proceedings 
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before District Court, p. 13.) On June 22, 1988, the court 
dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction. Two months later, the court 
dismissed plaintiffs1 action against Surety Life. (See 6/22/88 and 
8/26/88 Orders, attached collectively as Addendum No. 5.) 
The Draper property was finally sold pursuant to a trustee's 
sale on July 27, 1988, for $700,000. One day prior to the 
scheduled sale, Wayne Burningham filed in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court an involuntary chapter 11 petition on behalf of 
"Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage, a Utah Partnership." (Addendum 
No. 6.) Shortly, after the trustee's sale, Wayne Burningham, 
appearing on behalf of Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage, filed a 
motion in the Bankruptcy Court to show cause asserting that Surety 
Life had proceeded with the trustee's sale in violation of the 
chapter 11 automatic stay. (Addendum No. 7.) 
Because Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage alleged a possessory 
interest in the Draper property, Surety Life moved the Bankruptcy 
Court for relief from the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 
362. After two days of trial in December of 1988, the Bankruptcy 
Court found that the Draper property was not property of the 
bankruptcy estate and that Surety Life was therefore entitled to 
relief from the stay. The Bankruptcy Court also determined that 
the foreclosure sale was not a violation of the stay. After 
careful review of an independent fee appraiser and report and 
testimony, the Bankruptcy Court also made a finding of fact that 
the value of the Draper property was $700,000. An order granting 
relief from the stay was later signed and entered by the Bankruptcy 
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Court. (See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and Order 
Granting Relief from Stay, attached as Addendum No. 8.) 
Surety Life then brought action against Burningham and the 
other defendants to recover the balance due on the note following 
foreclosure in reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 51-1-32 (1953) and in 
reliance on the guaranty agreement. (See R. 2-42.) Surety Life 
later amended its complaint to consolidate its cause of action on 
the guaranty agreement with its action for a deficiency judgment. 
(R. 52-58; 103-104; 133-35.) Because Hucks and Markwest failed to 
respond to Surety Life's complaint, a default judgment was entered 
against these defendants. (R. 145-46. ) 
On March 8, 1989, Surety Life filed a motion for summary 
judgment against Burningham based on the terms of the guaranty 
agreement. (R. 155-60. ) Sometime later, Surety Life filed a 
notice to submit for decision and request for ruling on the grounds 
that Burningham had not filed a response. (R. 186-87.) On that 
very day, Surety Life received an affidavit of Wayne Burningham 
that attempted to raise a question as to the fair market value of 
the Draper property. (R. 188-91.) Burningham never filed a 
memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to Surety Life's 
motion for summary judgment. 
In April of 1989, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Surety Life and against Burningham. (R. 246.) Shortly 
thereafter, Burningham and the other defendants, who already had 
default judgments entered against them, filed a counterclaim, 
alleging that Surety Life was jointly liable with United Savings 
for various lender liability claims. (R. 248-58.) These claims 
were precisely the same claims that Burningham and Draper RV & 
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Commercial Storage had asserted against Surety Life and United 
Savings which were dismissed as to Surety Life. (R. 260-62; 270-
72; 286-87. ) 
Burningham also filed a Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the 
Summary Judgment. Following a hearing on this motion and on all 
other motions filed by the defendants, the trial court entered an 
order denying Burninghamfs motion to set aside the summary judgment 
entered against him, denying Hucks motion to set aside the default 
judgment entered against him, and denying Markwest's and Hucks1 
motion to file an answer and counterclaim. (Addendum No. 1.) 
Burningham then filed a notice of appeal of the summary 
judgment granted against him. Surety Life filed a motion to 
dismiss Burninghamfs appeal on the grounds that Burningham had 
failed to comply with any of the rules governing the filing of 
appeals and disregarded several warnings from the Utah Supreme 
Court and Utah Court of Appeals that failure to cure these defaults 
would result in dismissal of the appeal. (See Addendum, No. 9.) 
On December 20, 1989, Burningham informed this Court that on June 
29, 1989, he had filed a Chapter 7 Petition in Bankruptcy. (See 
January 9, 1990 Utah Court of Appeals Notice of Status Conference, 
attached as Addendum No. 10.) This Court then instructed the 
parties to file memoranda explaining why the appeal should or 
should not be dismissed as moot based on Burninghamfs bankruptcy 
filing. (See February 26, 1991 Utah Court of Appeals Notice of Sua 
Sponte Consideration by the Court for Summary Disposition, attached 
as Addendum No. 11.) Memoranda were filed and a scheduling 
conference presided over by Judge Orme was held on August 1, 1991. 
Judge Orme denied Surety Life's motion to dismiss the appeal and 
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required Burninghamfs appellate brief to be filed by September 16, 
1991 and Surety Life's reply brief to be filed a month later. (See 
Addendum No. 2.) After a notice of default was issued, Burningham 
filed a brief. Surety Life now files its response brief to 
Burningham's appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Burninghamfs analysis in this appeal is at best confusing. 
The issues he raises concerning the non-appealing defendants are 
impertinent to this Court's decision. Notwithstanding the sinuous 
procedural history in this case and the mixing of irrelevant 
issues, resolution of the appropriate issues raised in Burningham's 
behalf is clear. 
There is no evidence that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying Burningham's motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the summary judgment. The 
chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed on behalf of Draper R.V. & 
Commercial Storage, did not stay the action brought by Surety Life 
against Burningham. Because the bankruptcy petition was filed 
under chapter 11, not chapter 13, the automatic stay provision of 
11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) which Burningham cites to has no application in 
this case. The language in chapter 11 and the sizeable case 
authority applying chapter 11 conclusively establish that the 
chapter 11 automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not extend 
to co-debtor partners. 
Moreover, Hucks' reliance on the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition filed on behalf of R.V. & Storage did not justify relief 
sought by Burningham. Hucks is not a party to this appeal and his 
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so-called reliance has no bearing on the merits of Burninghamfs 
appeal. 
The record is devoid of a single genuine issue of fact 
regarding Burningham's competency to enter into the guaranty 
agreement. Burningham does not carry his burden and does not set 
forth sufficient evidence to make out a triable issue of fact on 
his competency. Because a trial would be useless, Surety Life is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Contrary to Burninghamfs argument, the market value of the 
subject property at the time of the trustee's sale is not at issue 
in this case, let alone a genuine issue of material fact. This 
case is not merely a deficiency action, but an action on 
Burningham's unconditional guarantee to repay a promissory note. 
By agreement, Burningham waived all defenses and agreed to the 
entry of judgment. 
Even if the fair market value of the subject property was an 
issue, principles of collateral estoppel bar the issue from again 
being litigated. The Bankruptcy Court, following two days of trial 
and based on competent independent appraisal reports and testimony, 
made a finding of fact that the fair market value of the Draper 
property was $700,000. 
Burningham fails to state any grounds for a reversal of the 
trial court's order denying Burningham's motion to set aside the 
summary judgment entered against him. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Burninghamfs Utah R. Civ. Pro. 60(b) Motion 
to Set Aside the Summary Judgment. 
Burningham presents two alternative grounds to support his 
position that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set 
aside the summary judgment. Burningham first asserts that the 
filing of a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Draper R.V. 
& Commercial Storage, a Utah Partnership, stayed the action brought 
by Surety Life against Burningham and the other defendants.2 In 
the alternative, Burningham claims that reliance on the Bankruptcy 
petition filed on behalf of R.V. & Commercial Storage constituted 
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Neither of these grounds compel this Court to determine 
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying 
Burningham's motion to set aside the summary judgment. 
A. The automatic stay provisions of 
Chapters 11 and 13 of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code did not apply to 
Burningham. 
Burningham erroneously represents that he, along with the 
other defendants, was a co-debtor with Draper R.V. & Commercial 
Storage under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The 
bankruptcy petition filed on behalf of Draper R.V. & Commercial 
Storage was filed under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, not 
2A1though Burningham does not state so, he presumably advances 
this argument under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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chapter 13. Thus, automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) 
which Burningham cites to has no application in this case.3 
Unlike chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the provisions of 
chapter 11 are devoid of any specific language extending the 
automatic stay to co-debtors or partners of the debtor. Section 
362(a) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that 
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy operates as a stay of only 
the debtor: 
§ 362. Automatic stay. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of 
this section, a petition filed under section 
301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an applica-
tion filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Secu-
rities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 
U.S.C. 78(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applica-
ble to all entities, of— 
(1) the commencement or continuation, 
including the issuance or employment of pro-
cess, of a judicial, administrative, or other 
action or proceeding against the debtor that 
was or could have been commenced before the 
commencement of the case under this title 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor 
or against property of the estate, of a judg-
ment obtained before the commencement of the 
case under this title; 
3Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides in 
part: 
§ 1301. Stay of action against codebtor 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) 
and (c) of this section, after the order for 
relief under this chapter, a creditor may not 
act, or commence or continue any civil action, 
to collect all or any part of a consumer debt 
of the debtor from any individual that is 
liable on such debt with the debtor, or that 
secured such debt . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1991). 
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(3) any act to obtain possession of 
property of the estate or of property from the 
estate or to exercise control over property of 
the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or en-
force any lien against property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or en-
force against property of the debtor any lien 
to the extent that such lien secures a claim 
that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recov-
er a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case under this 
title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of 
the case under this title against any claim 
against the debtor; and 
(8) the commencement or continuation of a 
proceeding before the United States Tax Court 
concerning the debtor. 
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1991) (emphasis added). "Debtor" is defined as 
a "person or municipality concerning which a case under this title 
has been commenced. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1991). A "person" 
includes individuals, partnerships and corporations. 11 U.S.C. § 
101(31) (1991). The language of chapter 11 limits automatic stays 
to debtors only; there is no provision that expressly, or even 
impliedly, authorizes automatic stays against co-debtors. 
A well-established proposition in bankruptcy law is that the 
chapter 11 automatic stay does not extend to co-debtors. Citing a 
long string of case citations, the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Utah explicitly held in In re Arrow Huss, Inc., 
51 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), that chapter 11 does not 
prohibit actions against co-debtors: 
13 
It is well settled that Section 362 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which stays actions against 
the debtor and against property of the estate, 
does not forbid actions against its nondebtor 
principals, partners, officers, employees, co-
obligors, guarantors, or sureties. The legis-
lative history shows that Congress may have 
considered the issue of a general stay of 
actions against guarantors in reorganization 
cases, but apparently rejected such a blanket 
stay and limited co-debtor stays to Chapter 
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1301. As enacted, Chap-
ter 11 contains no specific provision autho-
rizing stays against nondebtor codefendants. 
Id. at 856 (citations & footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). In 
holding that the automatic stay does not apply to the principal of 
two debtor entities, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York states in language especially germane 
to this appeal: 
For bankruptcy purposes the partnership debtor 
is a separate and distinct entity from its 
partners. . . . Hence, a Chapter 11 debtor 
partnership is not entitled to enjoin state 
court suits commenced against partners indi-
vidually. 
In re Autobahn Classics, Inc., 29 Bankr. 625, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1983) (emphasis added) (citing Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Bear, 276 U.S. 
215 (1928); In re Dress Shop, 516 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1975); Aboussie 
Bros., 8 Bankr. 302 (E.D. Mo. 1981)). Finally, one of the premier 
authorities on bankruptcy drives home the prescript that the 
chapter 11 automatic stay does not extend to co-debtor partners: 
[the automatic stay] does not, however, extend 
to separate legal entities such as corporate 
affiliates, partners in debtor partnerships, 
or to co-defendants in pending litigation. 
2 K. Clee, R. Levin, H. Miller and P. Murphy, Collier on Bankruptcy 
1f 362.04 (15th ed. 1979) (emphasis added) (citing Lynch v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983); Williford v. 
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Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1983); 
Aboussie Bros. Constr. Co. v. United Missouri Bank, 8 Bankr. 302 
(E.D. Mo. 1981); Nevada Nat'l Bank v. Casgul of Nevada (In re 
Casgul of Nevada, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)). 
Contrary to Burninghamfs contention, the bankruptcy petition 
filed on behalf of Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage did not 
automatically stay Surety Life's action against Burningham. Hence, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding with the 
action and entering summary judgment against Burningham. 
B. Hucks' reliance on the filing of the 
Bankruptcy Petition filed on behalf 
of R.V. & Commercial Storage did not 
justify the relief requested by 
Burningham. 
Burningham's argument that reliance on the Bankruptcy petition 
filed on behalf of R.V. & Commercial Storage constituted excusable 
neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
disingenuous. To support his contention, Burningham refers soley 
to Hucks' affidavit which states that because Hucks relied on 
Surety Life's motion for relief from the stay, he subsequently 
delayed filing his answer to Surety Life's complaint. However, 
Hucks is not a party to this appeal. Any "excusable neglect" with 
regard to Hucks or any defendants other than Burningham has no 
bearing on Burningham's Rule 60(b) argument on appeal. Burningham 
sets forth no other facts on appeal to support his contention that 
the trial court abused its discretion under Rule 60(b) in refusing 
to set aside the summary judgment entered against Burningham. 
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II. Burningham fails to state genuine issues of material fact 
that would preclude summary judgment for Surety Life as 
a matter of law. 
Burningham proffers the following as genuine issues of 
material fact: 1) whether Burningham was incompetent to sign the 
guaranty and 2) what was the market value of the property at the 
time of the trustee's sale. As shown below, neither of these 
issues present genuine issues of material fact that preclude the 
trial court's entry of summary judgment against Burningham. 
A. No genuine issue of material fact 
exists regarding Burningham's compe-
tency . 
Burningham fails to muster any evidence, let alone sufficient 
evidence, to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
Burningham's competency. When evaluating whether the evidence 
reveals a genuine issue of material fact, the appellate court must 
consider the eventual standard of proof at trial. Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. of App. 
1987). A party asserting incapacity to enter into a contract has 
the burden of proving such by clear and convincing evidence. 
Jimenez v. O'Bricm, 117 Utah 82, 213 P.2d 337, 339-40 (1949); see 
also Hendricksen v. Simper, 24 Arizona App. 415, 539 P.2d 529, 532 
(1975). The Utah Supreme Court has outlined in clear terms the 
standard that constitutes competency to contract: 
In ordinary contracts the test is, Were [sic] 
the mental faculties so deficient or impaired 
that there was not sufficient power to compre-
hend the subject of the contract, its nature 
and its probable consequences, and to act with 
discretion in relation thereto, or with rela-
tion to the ordinary affairs of life? 
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Jimenez, 213 P.2d at 339 (quoting Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 
P. 433, 438 (1914)). Because Burningham does not carry his burden 
and set forth sufficient evidence to make out a triable issue of 
fact regarding his capacity to comprehend the subject of the 
guaranty agreement and its probable consequences, a trial would be 
useless and Surety Life is entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law. 
There is not a shred of evidence in the record that Burningham 
was incompetent for health reasons, as he contends, or otherwise, 
when Burningham signed the guaranty agreement. Burningham even 
freely admits that there "is nothing in the record to explain 
defendant Melvin Burninghamfs health." (See Appellants' Brief, p. 
20. ) To support his contention of incompetency, Burningham merely 
offers excuses as to why the record lacks such evidence and 
misconstrues facts to fashion a vague impression that he was not 
fully competent when he signed the guaranty agreement. As shown 
below none of these arguments rise to the level of a triable or 
genuine issue of material fact. 
Burningham first suggests that for reasons explained in an 
affidavit filed with the trial court, his counsel did not have time 
to proffer evidence to support Burningham's incompetency allega-
tion. This assertion is specious. The affidavit that Burningham 
refers to was submitted to the trial court to justify Burninghamfs 
counsel's dilatory conduct on behalf of all the defendants in 
responding to the trial court's various orders and Surety Life's 
motions. The affidavit does not mention, or even suggest, that 
counsel for Burningham lacked sufficient time to muster evidence to 
support his position by affidavit or otherwise. Moreover, it is 
17 
inconceivable that this court, or any other appellate court, would 
find a genuine issue of material fact simply because appellant 
lacked the time or resources to proffer evidence at the trial court 
level. 
Next, Burningham asserts that there is "absolute proof" that 
he was confused at his deposition. Any confusion Burningham may 
have experienced at his deposition, no matter how absolute the 
proof, hardly creates a genuine or triable issue of fact that 
Burningham was incompetent when he signed the guaranty agreement. 
There is no connection between his ability at his deposition to 
recollect details concerning past events and his competency at the 
signing of the guaranty agreement. 
Moreover, what this "absolute proof" consists of is a mystery. 
Burningham merely cites to page 157 of the record for support that 
he believed that the guaranty agreement and the promissory note 
were the same. The significance of this allegation is not dis-
closed. Ironically, page 157 of the record is part of Surety 
Life's memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. 
This page consists of an excerpt from Burningham's deposition 
Surety Life quotes to show that at the time Burningham executed the 
guaranty agreement he clearly understood the nature and effect of 
the contract. This excerpt reads as follows: 
Q. There's a guaranty agreement which is 
Exhibit 3, this is at the top of your file. 
Do you know what the legal significance of 
this is or what this guaranty agreement does 
as far as you personally, Mr. Burningham? 
A. Well, I think it — I signed the notice 
saying that I guaranty that I' 11 make payments 
on the amount of money that I borrowed. 
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Q. Do you know what the difference is be-
tween this and the promissory note? 
A. No, I think they're one in the same. 
Q. And did you know at the time you signed 
it what the difference was or was it one in 
the same to you? 
A. To me, it's one in the same. I mean, I 
agreed that we received that money and the 
guaranty agreement is we'll pay it back. 
That's my understanding of it. 
(R. 157) (emphasis added). 
Rather than illustrate incompetency on the part of Burningham, 
this excerpt makes absolutely clear the fact that Burningham 
understood that the guaranty agreement personally obligated him to 
repay the monies owing. 
Finally, Burningham cites to corrections in his deposition to 
suggest that he had a poor memory. Again, his ability at the 
deposition to recall details has no bearing on his capacity to 
enter into the guaranty agreement. The corrections in his 
deposition merely clarify parts of Burningham !s testimony regarding 
events, times and conversations that have nothing to do with his 
capacity to enter into the guaranty agreement. (R. 180. ) 
Burningham fails to show that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to whether he was competent to enter into the guaranty 
agreement with Surety Life. The guaranty agreement is plain, 
simple and unambiguous. It obligated the parties to uncondi-
tionally pay the loan amount and gave their assent to an entry of 
judgment against them to insure enforcement of its terms. There is 
no showing by Burningham that the evidence presents a sufficient 
disagreement to require submission to the trier of fact. 
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B. The fair market value of the subject 
property at the time of the trus-
tee's sale is not a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
Burningham contends that the main issue to be tried is that of 
the market value of the Draper property at the time of the 
trustee's sale. This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the 
nature of this case. This case is not a mere deficiency action, 
but is an action on Burningham's unconditional guaranty to repay a 
promissory note. 
Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Code provides the remedy for 
securing a deficiency judgment following a sale of real property 
under a trust deed. This provision states in pertinent part: 
At any time within three months after any sale 
of property under a trust deed, as hereinabove 
provided, an action may be commenced to recov-
er the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security, 
and in such action the complaint shall set 
forth the entire amount of the indebtedness 
which was secured by such trust deed, the 
amount for which such property was sold, and 
the fair market thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall 
find the fair market value at the date of sale 
of the property sold. The court may not 
render judgment for more than the amount by 
which the amount of the indebtedness with 
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, includ-
ing trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the 
fair market value of the property as of the 
date of the sale. In any action brought under 
this section, the prevailing parties shall be 
entitled to collect its costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in bringing an action 
under this section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1990) (emphasis added). 
Surety Life, in instituting this action, was not merely 
proceeding to collect the balance due "upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security." In addition, Surety 
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Life also proceeded on the guaranty agreement signed by Burningham 
and the defendants in their individual capacities. 
Although a guaranty agreement, by its terms, necessarily 
collateral to a primary or principal obligation (the note in this 
case), it does create a separate and independent obligation. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 
P.2d 741 (Utah 1982), stated: 
Thus, a guaranty of payment is absolute and a 
guaranteed party need not fix its losses by 
pursuing its remedies against the debtor or 
the security before proceeding directly 
against the guarantor. 
Id. at 743 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized the separate contractual nature of a 
guaranty agreement. 
The very terms of the guaranty agreement in this case make 
clear that the guaranties created obligations independent from 
Burningham's and the defendants' obligations under the note and 
other loan documents. Recitals contained in the guaranty agreement 
state that Surety Life was unwilling to make the loan to Burningham 
and the defendants ("guarantors") unless the guarantors guaranteed 
payment of their obligations and performance of their covenants. 
The recitals further state that the guarantors desire to give a 
guaranty to Surety Life in order to induce Surety Life to make the 
loan to the guarantors. (See Addendum No. 3.) 
Significantly, paragraph no. 1 of the guaranty agreement 
states that the guarantors 
[unconditionally an absolutely guarantee the 
due and punctual payment of the principal of 
the note, the interest thereon (including 
adjustments and increases therein) and any 
other sums due or which may become due thereon 
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and the due and punctual performance and 
observance by the Borrower of all of the other 
terms, provisions, covenants and conditions of 
the Note, Deed of Trust and other Loan Docu-
ments • 
(See Addendum No. 3.) 
By its very terms, § 57-1-32 is limited to pursuing deficiency 
actions against trustors following trustee sales of property 
covered under the trust deeds. Accordingly, because this is not 
just an action against the trustor for a deficiency following the 
trustee's sale of the property, the fair market value of the 
property sold at the trustee's sale is not an issue in this case. 
As stated above, this was also an action against the guarantors on 
a written contract. The clear and unambiguous terms of the 
guaranty agreement at issue in this case bind Burningham and the 
defendants to pay their obligations whether or not Surety Life 
chose to pursue a deficiency action against the borrowers and 
whether before rendering judgment, the court determined the fair 
market value of the property sold. 
Significantly, Burningham and the defendants knowingly waived 
any defenses provided by § 57-1-32 when they executed the guaranty 
agreement. See Valley Bank v. Larsen, 104 Idaho 772, 663 P.2d 653 
(1983) (a guarantor may legally contract to waive a defense 
provided by a deficiency judgment statute); see also Riverside 
Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 (Okl. 1980) (guarantor 
had waived certeiin statutory defenses). The guaranty agreement 
provides that Surety may sell the property held as security, and 
that the guarantors, including Burningham, "hereby waive any 
defense to recovery against the guarantors of any deficien-
cy. . . ." (See 1f 6, Addendum No. 3) (emphasis added). Paragraph 
22 
15 of the guaranty agreement provides that the guarantors "consent 
to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Utah and agree 
that the beneficiary under the note shall be entitled to a judgment 
and decree and enforcement by the Courts of the State of Utah . . 
. ." (See 1f 15, id,) Burningham has no defense to the judgment 
entered. By agreement, Burningham has waived all defenses and 
agreed to the entry of judgment. 
C. Even if the fair market value of the 
subject property was a triable issue 
of fact, principles of collateral 
estoppel bar the relitigation of 
this issue. 
Without question, the fair market value of the subject 
property in this action is not a triable issue of material fact. 
Even assuming that it was, Burningham still loses. Following two 
days of hearings, and after reviewing competent and independent 
appraisal reports and testimony, the Bankruptcy Court determined 
that the fair market value of the subject property was $700,000. 
On principles of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, the issue 
of the fair market value of the subject property at the time of 
sale is barred in this action. See Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, 
Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983) (collateral estoppel, or issue 
preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues that have been once 
litigated and determined in another action even though the claims 
for relief in the two actions may be different). 
The elements required if the determination of an issue in a 
preceding case is to bind the parties in a later case are well-
established in Utah: 
(i) the issues must be identical, (ii) the 
judgment must be final, (iii) the party es-
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topped must be a party or in privity with a 
party to the preceding adjudication, and (iv) 
the issue must have been competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated. 
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1988); Baxter v. Department of 
Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1985). 
Each of these elements is satisfied in this case. The issue 
regarding the fair market value of the subject property is 
obviously identical in both actions. The judgment in the Bankrupt-
cy Court was final. (See Addendum, No. 8.) As a co-debtor and 
partner, Burningham was in privity with Draper R.V. & Commercial 
Storage, the party in the preceding bankruptcy action. Finally, 
the issue of the fair market value of the subject property at the 
time of sale was competently, fully and fairly litigated. Hearings 
lasted two days and the Bankruptcy Court scrupulously reviewed 
competent independent appraisal reports and testimony. Based on 
its review, the Bankruptcy Court specifically made a finding of 
fact that the value of the subject property was $700,000. Under 
the principles of collateral estoppel, even if the fair market 
value of the Draper property was a triable issue of material fact, 
the issue having already been litigated and determined in the 
Bankruptcy Court is barred from further consideration by the trial 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
Burningham has failed to state any grounds that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment 
entered against him and has failed to show triable issues of 
material fact that preclude the trial courtf s granting of summary 
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judgment to Surety Life as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial 
court's order should be affirmed in all respects and Surety Life 
should be awarded its costs. 
DATED this lo'^ day of November, 1991. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed in 
the law firm of Campbell, Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main Street, 
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah and in said capacity and pursuant 
to Rule 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were hand 
delivered on this /y7>^ ~ day of November, 1991, to the following: 
J. Douglas Kinateder 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 112 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, HOWARD H. 
HUCKS, MARKWEST CORPORATION, 
a California corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. C88-05729 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
pursuant to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of the 
above-entitled Court on Friday, June 2, 1989 on various motions of 
the Defendants. The Plaintiff was represented by Clark W. Sessions 
and Clark L. Snelson of Sessions & Moore, its attorneys, and the 
Defendants were represented by J. Douglas Kinateder, their 
attorney. The Court heard the arguments and statements of counsel, 
reviewed the files and records including the memoranda and exhibits 
thereto on file herein and being fully advised in the premises 
hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1. That the Motion of the Defendant Howard H. Hucks to set 
aside the Default Judgment heretofore made and entered against him 
be and the same is hereby denied, and, 
2. That the motion of the Defendant Melvin K. Burningham to 
vacate or set aside the summary judgment heretofore made and 
entered against him be and the same is hereby denied, and, 
3. That the motion of the Defendants Markwest Corporation 
i 
and Howard W. Hucks to file an Answer and Counterclaim be and the* 
same is hereby denied. 
DATED this /J}^ day of June, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
(*/^-j~r-) I^-JCX^ **-- ^ S^-^-t>— 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
District Judge 
1092-80J.PL3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day of June, 1989, the 
foregoing ORDER was served on Defendants by hand delivering a true 
and correct copy thereof, to: 
J. Douglas Kinateder, Esq. 
2040 East 4800 South 
Suite 112 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Surety Life Insurance Company, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Melvin K. Burningham, 
Markwest Corporation, a 
California corporation, and 
John Does I-X, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
C^u^fl^ 
" » e * c « * * Court 
Uan Coi4ftqft<f 
ORDER RE BANKRUPTCY ISSUES 
Case No. 890594-CA 
The court conducted a status and scheduling conference 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 28, presided over by the 
undersigned, on August 1, 1991, at 11:00 a.m. Appellant 
appeared through his counsel, J. Douglas Kinateder. The 
trustee in appellant's bankruptcy case, Stephen W. Rupp, also 
appeared. Appellee appeared through its counsel, John C. 
Martinson. Based upon discussion with counsel, review of this 
court's entire file, and review of bankruptcy documents 
furnished at the conference, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Of the several defendants listed in the action 
below, only Melvin K. Burningham appealed. Upon the filing of 
a bankruptcy petition by Burninqham, His rights and claims 
pertaining to this matter became assets of his bankruptcy 
estate. By operation of law, his trustee has succeeded thereto 
6. The undersigned shall not participate in the 
decision of this appeal on the merits. 
BY THE COURT 
Gregor^^^-trfme, Judge <gfc/Q I 
Tab 3 
GUARANTY AGREEMENT 
THIS GUARANTY AGREEMENT (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Agreement'') is made and entered into this 9th day of ©eeewbe^jJanuary 
1987193-6-r by and between HOWARD H. HUCKS, WAYNE BURNINGHAM and MELVIN 
K. BURNINGHAM (hereinafter collectively termed the "Guarantors") , 
to and for the benefit of SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation with principal offices located at 200 East South 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, its assigns and Participants 
(hereinafter collectively termed the "Beneficiary"). 
WHEREAS, MARKWEST CORPORATION, a California corporation and 
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, individually (hereinafter collectively 
termed the "Borrower") has applied to the Beneficiary for a loan 
in the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00), to be 
evidenced by a Promissory Note (Secured by Deed of Trust with 
Assignment of Rents and Leases) (hereinafter termed "the Note") 
of even date herewith, secured by a certain Deed of Trust W^th 
Assignment of Rents and Leases of even date herewith (hereinafter 
termed the "Deed of Trust"), and further secured by other loan 
documents executed between the Borrower and the Beneficiary 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Loan Documents") ; 
and 
WHEREAS, the Beneficiary is unwilling to make said loan 
unless the Guarantors guarantee the payment of principal, 
interest and other consideration specified herein and any other 
charges provided for in the Note, Deed of Trust and the other 
Loan Documents, and the performance by the Borrower of all the 
covenants on its part to be performed and observed pursuant to 
the provisions thereof; 
WHEREAS, Guarantors desire to give such guarantee to 
Beneficiary in order to induce Beneficiary to make and complete 
said loan, and further, Guarantors share a direct or indirect 
financial interest in the property described in the Deed of Trust 
and/or the Borrower; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of these premises, for the 
purpose of inducing Beneficiary to make the aforesaid loan to 
Borrower, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt 
and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Guarantors 
hereby: 
1. Unconditionally and absolutely guarantee the due and 
punctual payment of the principal of the Note, the interest 
thereon (including adjustments and increases therein) and any 
other sums due or which may become due thereon, and the due and 
punctual performance and observance by the Borrower of all of the 
other terms, provisions, covenants and conditions of the Note, 
Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents, whether according to 
the present terms thereof, at an earlier or accelerated date or 
dates as provided therein, or pursuant to any extension of time 
or to any change or changes in the terms, covenants, and 
conditions thereof now or at any time hereafter made, granted or 
extended. 
2. Understand and agree to pay the costs and expenses 
incurred by or in behalf of the Beneficiary (including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorney's fees and expenses) in enforcing 
the obligations of the Guarantors under this Agreement and the 
obligations of the Borrower with respect to the indebtedness 
evidenced by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan 
Documents. For purposes of this document, attorney's fees shall 
include reasonable attorney's fees and costs actually incurred 
incident and relating to any settlement or loan work c^ ut 
negotiations. 
3. The obligations hereunder shall be joint and several, and 
shall be absolute, unconditional and independent of the obliga-
tions of the Borrower in respect of the indebtedness of the 
Borrower evidenced by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other 
Loan Documents, irrespective of any circumstances which might 
constitute a legal or equitable discharge of a surety or 
guarantor. Such obligations shall not be discharged, affected, 
modified, or impaired upon the happening from time to time of any 
event, including, without limitation, any of the following, 
whether or not with notice to, or the consent of, the Guarantors: 
(a) the invalidity, irregularity, illegality, frus-
tration or unenforceability of, or any defect in the Note, 
the Deed of Trust or any of the other Loan Documents., 
(b) any present or future law or order of any govern-
ment (de jure or de facto) or of any agency thereof 
Purporting to reduce, amend or otherwise affect the indebted-
ness of the Sorrower evidenced by the Note, or to vary any 
term$ of payment thereof; 
(c) the waiver, compromise,, settlement, release, 
extension, amendment, change, modiiication or termination.of 
the terms of, or any or all of the obligations, covenants or 
agreements of (i) the Borrower under the Note, the Deed of 
Trust and any of the other Loan Documents (except by payment 
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in full of the indebtedness evidenced thereby) or (ii) the 
Guarantors under this Agreement (except by payment in full of 
all obligations hereunder); 
(d) the failure to give notice to the Guarantors or any 
of them of the occurrence of a default or event of default 
under the Note, the Deed of Trust or any of the other Loan 
Documents; 
(e) the release, transfer, sale, exchange, assignment, 
sublease, pledge, hypothecation or mortgaging, surrender or 
other change in any collateral security now or hereafter 
given by the Borrower for payment of the Note or the 
performance of the Borrower's obligations under the Deed of 
Trust or any of the other Loan Documents; 
(f) the extension -of the time for payment of the 
indebtedness evidenced by the Note or any part thereof owing 
or payable by the Borrower or under this Agreement or of the 
time for performance of any other obligations, covenants ^ or 
agreements under or arising out of the Note, the Deed of 
Trust, or any of the other Loan Documents, or this Agreement 
or the extension or the renewal of any thereof: 
(g) the modification or amendment (whether material or 
otherwise) of any obligation covenant or agreement set forth 
in this Agreement: 
(h) the taking of, or the omission to take, any of the 
actions referred to in the Note, the Deed of Trust or any of 
the other Loan Documents or this Agreement: 
(i) any failure, omission or delay on the part of the 
Beneficiary, or any other person, to enforce, assert or 
exercise any right, power or remedy conferred in this Agree-
ment, the Note, the Deed of Trust or any of the other Loan 
Documents; 
(j) the voluntary or involuntary liquidation, 
dissolution, sale or other disposition of all or substan-
tially all the assets, marshalling of assets and liabilities, 
receivership, insolvency, bankruptcy, assignment for the 
benefit of creditors, reorganization, arrangement or 
composition with creditors or readjustment of, or other 
similar proceedings affecting any Guarantor or the Borrower 
or any of the assets of any of them, or any allegation or 
contest of the validity of the Note, Deed of Trust, this 
Agreement or any of the other Loan Documents, or the 
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disaffirmance or attempted disaffirmance of the Note, Deed of 
Trust, this Agreement or any of the other Loan Documents, in 
any such proceedings; 
(k) any event or action that would, in the absence of 
this paragraph, result in the release or discharge of any 
Guarantor from the performance or observance of any obli-
gation, covenant or agreement contained in this or any other 
guaranty; and 
(1) the default or failure of any Guarantor fully to 
Perform any of its obligations set forth in this Agreement or 
any other guaranty, 
4. Acknowledge and agree that a separate action or actions 
may be brought and prosecuted against the Guarantors whether such 
action is brought against the Borrower or whether the Borrower be 
joined in any such action or actions; and the Guarantors waive 
the benefit of any statute of limitations affecting their 
liability hereunder or the enforcement thereof to the extent 
permitted by law. Any part payment by the Borrower or ottfer 
circumstances which operate to toll any statute of limitations as 
to the Borrower shall operate to toll the statute of limitations 
as to Guarantors. Every claim or demand which Guarantors, or any 
of them, may have against the Borrower shall be fully subordinate 
to the indebtedness evidenced by the Note, the Deed of Trust and 
the other Loan Documents. 
5. Acknowledge and agree to waive any right to require the 
Beneficiary (a) to proceed against the Borrower; (b) to proceed 
against or exhaust any security for the indebtedness evidenced by 
the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents now or 
hereafter held; or (c) to pursue any other remedy in their power 
whatsoever. The Beneficiary may, at its election, exercise any 
right or remedy it may have against the Borrower or any security 
now or hereafter held, including without limitation, the right to 
foreclose upon any security by judicial or nonjudicial sale, 
without affecting or impairing in any way the liability of 
Guarantors hereunder except to the extent the indebtedness 
evidence by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan 
Documents has been paid, and the Guarantors waive any defense 
arising out of the absence, impairment or loss of any right of 
reimbursement or subrogation or other right or remedy of 
Guarantors against the Borrower or any such security, whether 
resulting from such election, or otherwise. The Guarantors waive 
any defense arising by reason of any disability or other defense 
of the Borrower or by reason of the cessation from any cause 
whatsoever of the liability of the Borrower. Until the 
4 
indebtedness evidenced by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the 
other Loan Documents is paid in full, the Guarantors shall have 
no right of subrogation, and waive any right to enforce any 
remedy which the Beneficiary now has or may hereafter have 
against the Borrower, and waive any benefit of, and any right to 
participate in any security now or hereafter held by the 
Beneficiary. The Guarantors waive all presentments, demands for 
performance, notices of nonperformance, protests, notices of 
protest, notices of dishonor, and notices of acceptance and 
reliance on this Agreement. 
6. Acknowledge and agree that the Beneficiary may pursue its 
rights and remedies under this Agreement notwithstanding any 
other guaranty of or security for the indebtedness evidenced by 
the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents. The 
Guarantors acknowledge that all or a portion of the indebtedness 
evidenced by the Note, Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents 
is secured by the Deed of Trust. The Guarantors authorize the 
Beneficiary, at its sole option, without notice or demand $nd 
without affecting the liability of the Guarantors under t$is 
Agreement, to foreclose the Deed of Trust and the interests in 
real property secured thereby by judicial or nonjudicial sale, 
and the Guarantors hereby waive any defense to the recovery 
against Guarantors of any deficiency after a nonjudicial sale, 
and the Guarantors expressly waive any defense or benefits that 
may be derived from applicable law, and all suretyship defenses 
it would otherwise have under applicable law. The Guarantors 
waive any right to receive notice of the sale of any property 
subject to the Deed of Trust securing the indebtedness evidenced 
by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents, and 
the Guarantors' failure to receive any such notice shall not 
impair or affect Guarantors' liability hereunder. 
7. Understand and agree that each of the waivers set forth 
in this Agreement are made with full knowledge of their signifi-
cance and consequences, and that under the circumstances, the 
waivers are reasonable and are not contrary to public policy or 
law. If any of said waivers are determined to be contrary to any 
applicable law or public policy, such waivers shall be effective 
only to the maximum extent permitted by law. 
8. Understand and agree that this Agreement shall bind the 
successors and assigns of the Guarantors, and shall inure to the 
respective successors and assigns of the Beneficiary. 
9. Understand and agree that this Agreement shall be 
governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
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10. Understand and agree that in case any right of the 
Beneficiary herein shall be held to be invalid, illegal or 
unenforceable, such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability 
shall not affect any other right granted hereby. 
11. Understand and agree that all notices and other 
communications under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall 
be given by mailing such notice by Registered or Certified mail, 
addressed as hereinafter provided. Any notice Provided for 
herein shall be deemed received three (3) days following the date 
such written notice is deposited in the United States mails, or 
the time of the actual receipt, if earlier. Notice(s) shall be 
addressed to the parties hereto as follows: 
IF TO THE BENEFICIARY, TO: 
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
a Utah corporation 
200 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attn: W. F. Dickson 
IF TO THE GUARANTORS, TO: 
HOWARD H. HUCKS 
405 Alan Road 
Santa Barbara, California 93109 
MELVIN K. BURNINCHAM 
2761 Filmore Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
WAYNE BURNINCHAM 
11648 Player Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
12. Understand and agree that the terms of this Agreement 
may not be amended, changed or modified in any way except by a 
writing executed by the parties hereto, their respective 
successors or assigns, 
13. Understand and agree that this Agreement and the Note, 
the Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents executed by the 
Borrower and/or the Guarantors and/or the Beneficiary contain the 
entire agreement of the Guarantors and is not subject to any oral 
conditions. 
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14. Acknowledge that each of them has been provided with a 
full, true and complete copy of this Agreement, the Note, the 
Deed of Trust, and the other Loan Documents. 
15. Consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State 
of Utah and agree that the Beneficiary under the Note shall be 
entitled to a judgment and decree and enforcement by the Courts 
of the State of Utah for any amount which may be adjudged to be 
owing to the Beneficiary, including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorney's fees, interest and costs. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Guarantors have executed this 
Agreement in the day and year first above written. 
GUARANTORS:' 
B Y ^ f e ^ ^ 
/HOWARD H/HUCKS s • — " 
BY 
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM 
--O' */ Gis 
WAYNE BURNINGHAM 
i/ 
I A * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s . 
COUNTY OF
 Tip T l SALT LAKE 
On t h i s 9 th 
January 1987 
d a y o f -Deeea*be-2?7—1-9-8-6-, p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d 
b e f o r e me HOWARD H. HUCKS, o n e o f t h e s i g n e r s o f t h e a b o v e 
i n s t r u m e n t , who d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o me t h a t h e e x e c u t e d t h e 
s a m e . 
My C o m m i s s i o n E x p i r e s : 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g at:_ Bountiful , UT, 
7/9/88 




day of -©eoember-,—1-&-8-6-, personally appeared 
before me MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, one of the signers of the above 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On this 9th 
My Commission Expires: 
7/9/88 
J2t.#< '.. *LS t" C ^ V 
NOTARY^PUBLIC 
Residing at: Bountiful, UT. 
STATE OF UTAH 






January > 1987 
day of -Beeembe^—-19*6/ personally appeared 
before me WAYNE BURNINGHAM, one of the signers of the above 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
7/9/88 
JL 6-i^L ~>L «S d. <M* 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Bountiful, UT. 
0 1 / 0 9 / 8 7-[GBagrBURN] 
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I 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
KEVIN E. ANDERSON (0099) 
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (5050) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Surety Life Insurance Company 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DRAPER RV & COMMERCIAL STORAGE 
A Utah Partnership, MELVIN 




SURETY LIFE INSURANCE CO., a 
Utah Corporation, and UNITED 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT SURETY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, ITS MOTION 
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 
Civil No. C88-564 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant Surety Life Insurance Company (hereinafter "Sure-
ty") , by and Ihrough Sessions & Moore, its attorneys of record, 
submits the following Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint or in the Alternative, Its Motion 
for a More Definite Statement: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During 1985, Surety made a commitment to Mark-West 
Corporation to provide permanent financing for recreational 
vehicle and commercial storage units to be located in Draper, 
Utah. 
2. Thereafter, Mark-West obtained construction financing 
from Defendant United Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter 
"United Savings11) . 
3. On January 1, 1987, Surety loaned $1,000,000.00 to 
Mark-West Corporation and Melvin K. Burningham (hereinafter 
collectively "Mark-West"). The nature of Surety's loan was 
permanent financing for Mark-West's project. Surety was not 
involved in any way in the construction lending process nor in 
the construction of the project itself. 
4. The loan was secured by a Deed of Trust and Assignment 
of Rents and was recorded on January 9, 1987. Interest on the 
loan was at twelve and one-half percent (12%Z) ami the note 
called for installments of $10,673.00 monthly. Attached hereto as 
Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively and incorporated herein by 
reference are the Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust and 
Assignment of Rents. 
5. Surety had no right to control, nor did it control, in 
any way, any aspect of the construction process. 
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6. Surety had no right to control, not did it exercise any 
control, over any acts of United Savings, Mark-West's con-
struction lender, 
7. The only role played by Surety during the construction 
process of the project was that of the financial lending institu-
tion which had made a commitment for a permanent loan. 
8. The loan went into default by reason of non-payment of 
installments and demand was sent by certified mail on July 28, 
1987, to the appropriate parties. 
9. The Notice of Default and Election to Sell was recorded 
on September 15, 1987. A copy of the Notice of Default and 
Election to Sell is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incor-
porated herein by reference. 
10. A Notice of the Trustee1s Sale was served by posting 
and by sending copies of the same by certified mail to the 
appropriate parties and by publishing the same in the Salt Lake 
Times. A copy wt the Notice of Trustee's Sale is attached hereto 
as Exhibit ffDff and incorporated herein by reference. 
11. The Trustee's Sale was to have taken place on February 
1, 1988. 
12. Immediately prior to the scheduled Trustee's Sale, the 
Plaintiffs herein filed their Verified Complaint and Motion for a 
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Temporary Restraining Order, and the Court issued its Temporary 
Restraining Order on February 1, 1988 at 8:30 a.m. 
13. On June 22, 1988, this Court made a bench order dis-
solving the Temporary Restraining Order, denying Plaintiffs1 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and granting Surety ten days 
following entry of the Order within which to answer or otherwise 
plead to Plaintiffs1 Verified Complaint. The Order was entered 
June 24, 1988. 
14. Neither Plaintiff Draper RV & Commercial Storage, nor 
Plaintiff Wayne Burningham were parties to the transaction giving 
rise to this case, nor does either Plaintiff have privity of 
contract with Mark-West. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO 
UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 
LEGALLY COGNIZABLE CLAIM. 
Plaintiff Draper RV & Commercial Storage and Plaintiff Wayne 
Burningham have no standing to bring a Complaint against Surety 
nor is there any privity of contract between Mark-West and 
Plaintiffs Draper RV & Commercial Storage and Wayne Burningham; 
therefore, said Plaintiffs1 Complaint against Surety must be 
dismissed. 
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Plaintiff Melvin Keith Burningham was an individual signator 
in the original loan transaction with Surety; however, his 
Complaint against Surety must be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
In their verified complaint, Plaintiffs make the following 
representations concerning Surety: 
(1) That during the spring and summer of 1985, Plain-
tiff Burningham secured a commitment for long-term financing 
from Surety. 
(2) That certain parts of the project for which the 
long-term financing (permanent loan) was obtained had never 
been completed by either Defendant Surety or United Savings 
& Loan Association (although loan proceeds remained unused 
in United Savings' possession and control). 
(3) That at the time of the closing on the long-time 
financing with Surety, Surety was aware of and knew of the 
problems, changes, decreased value and rentability of the 
storage units, but agreed to join with United Savings as 
co-lender in the long-term loan, rather than as sole lender, 
thereby giving its sanction to, and joining with United 
Savings in United Savings' position on the project. 
(4) That both Surety and United Savings stand in the 
same position "on this matter" and have chosen to ignore the 
problems and responsibilities on their parts. 
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(5) That as a result of (among other things) failure 
of Defendants to complete the project, many would-be tenants 
have decided not to rent. 
(6) That the actions of Defendants were based on fraud 
and misrepresentation and conspiracy "regarding the original 
construction loan commitment and commitment fee, time for 
closing, and in taking over supervision of construction, 
negotiating and paying therefore, and making changes in 
construction plans and specifications, and in concealing 
facts which were material to the transaction." 
(7) That as a result of fraudulent conduct of Defen-
dants Plaintiffs have been damaged. 
(8) That both Defendants proceeded with the closing 
knowing that the project was not finished and that the 
workmanship and materials were inferior to that specified in 
the original plans. 
(9) That Surety accepted certain conduct of United 
Savings, and that the conduct of United Savings constituted 
a breach of fiduciary duty. 
(10) That as a result of the transactions and actions 
of Defendants, the project has not been finished, the value 
of that part of the completed project is diminished, Plain-
tiffs have not received proper value for the liability they 
incurred, and Plaintiffs1 original equity in the project and 
the value of their services are in jeopardy of being lost. 
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However, Plaintiffs have not alleged, nor can they, that 
(1) Surety was required to complete the project; 
(2) Surety had any responsibility for United Savings1 
actions; 
(3) Surety controlled disbursements; 
(4) Surety approved or had any right to approve con-
struction; 
(5) Surety approved or had any right to approve con-
struction changes; 
(6) Surety had any relationship with United Savings. 
Plaintiffs' conclusory statement that Surety conspired with 
United Savings is unsupported by any factual representation or 
inference. Moreover, Surety had no right to control, nor any 
right to remedy, United Savings1 actions. Plaintiffs state that 
Surety chose to ignore defects in the project and to provide 
co-lending with United Savings despite Surety1s knowledge of 
United Savings' actions. In fact, Surety had no legal 
alternative but to provide the permanent financing after it had 
committed itself to provide such financing. 
None of the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, even if true, give 
rise to a cause of action against Surety. The only actions 
Plaintiffs allege Surety directly undertook were (1) Surety's 
knowledge of United Savings' conduct with acceptance of the same, 
and (2) Surety's not completing the project. However, Surety's 
knowledge of United Savings' actions and acceptance of them do 
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not give rise to a claim absent some duty to control or right of 
control on SuretyTs part which Surety did not have. Furthermore, 
Surety had no right or authority to complete the construction of 
the project. Surety did not provide co-lending with United 
Savings but provided permanent financing in the amount to which 
it committed, while United Savings provided construction 
financing and permanent financing for that amount over and above 
the amount to which Surety had committed. 
Dismissal of a complaint is proper when, in viewing the 
allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs 
could not in any event establish a right to recover. Barrus v. 
Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (Utah 1965) (citing King Bros. Inc. 
v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254 (Utah 1962)). Accord Vigue v. 
Evans Products Co., 608 P.2d 488, 490 (Mont. 1980); Higgins v. 
State, 422 P.2d 836 (Wash. 1967). Furthermore, a complaint may 
be dismissed by motion if it is clearly without merit and the 
lack of merit consists of an absence of law supporting the sort 
of claim made. Wells v. Stanley J. Thill & Assoc, 452 P.2d 
1015, 1016 (Mont. 1969). 
Plaintiffs have failed to allege a legally cognizable claim 




PLAINTIFFS1 COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR 
FAILURE TO PLEAD FRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) states: tfIn all averments 
of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake shall be stated with particularity." 
The elements of fraud were set forth by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952): 
(1) that a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact 
rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to 
act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Id. at 274-275. 
Merely alleging each of these elements is insufficient. 
,fThe basic facts must be set forth with sufficient particularity 
to show what facts are claimed to constitute such charges.11 
Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1962). nThe purpose 
of [the Rule 9(b)] requirement dictates that it reach all circum-
stances where the pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, 
omissions, or other deceptions covered the by the term 'fraud1 in 
its broadest dimension.11 Williams v. State Farm Insurance 
Company, 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982). 
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In light of this criteria, Plaintiffs' fraud claims are 
severely deficient. As outlined in Point I, Plaintiffs alleged 
certain conduct on Surety's part. None of that conduct, however, 
even if true, supports a claim of fraud or fraudulent conduct. 
Plaintiffs have not only failed to allege that Surety made a 
fraudulent misrepresentation as defined by the Court in Pace v. 
Parrish, Plaintiffs failed to allege that Surety made any 
representation whatsoever, nor did Plaintiffs allege that Surety 
fraudulently omitted to state a material fact. In fact, the 
essence for Plaintiffs' fraud claim is contained in paragraph 19 
of Plaintiffs' Complaint: 
The transaction and actions of the defendants 
as described above were based on fraud and 
misrepresentation and conspiracy, regarding 
the original construction loan commitment and 
commitment fee, time for closing, and in 
taking over supervision of construction, 
negotiating and paying therefor, in making 
changes in construction plans and specifica-
tions , and in concealing facts which were 
material to the transaction. 
Surety, however, was not the construction lender, and had no 
involvement with the construction loan or the construction 
process. Plaintiffs attempt to tie Surety in with United Savings 
by indicating Surety accepted United Savings' conduct, but Surety 
had no control whatsoever over the conduct of United Savings. 
Plaintiffs' blanket allegations of fraud against Surety are 
insufficient to comply with Rule 9(b). Moreover, Plaintiffs 
failed to ascribe any particular fraudulent conduct to either 
T.7C7 /TJ_"7 M 
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Defendant. The latter, in itself, renders Plaintiffs1 Complaint 
insufficiently plead under Rule 9(b). See, e.g., Adair v. Hund 
International Resources, Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 744-45 (N.D. 
111. 1981); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cable/Tel. 
Corp., 90 F.R.D. 662, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' entire Complaint is plead in generalities. 
Surety is unable to adequately answer because of the vague and 
ambiguous nature of the pleading. Therefore, even if this Court 
does not dismiss Plaintiffs1 Complaint in its entirety, this 
Court must grant Surety's Alternative Motion for a More Definite 
Statement under Rule 12(e) and require the Plaintiffs to plead 
with particularity their claims as shown herein to be deficient. 
DATED this S~ day of July, 1988. 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Surety Life Insurance 
Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the S?* day of July, 1988, I 
caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM to: 
Glen W. Park, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
247 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Gregory S. Bell, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorney for Defendant United Savings 
& Loan Association 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Draper RV and Commercial Storage 
Melvin Keith Burningham 
Wayne Burningham 
2761 Filmore Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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Tab 5 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
KEVIN E. ANDERSON (0099) 
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (3981) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Surety Life Insurance Company 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DRAPER RV & COMMERCIAL STORAGE 
a Utah partnership, MELVIN 




SURETY LIFE INSURANCE CO., a 
Utah corporation, and UNITED 




Civil No. C88-564 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The Motion of the Defendant Surety Life Insurance Company to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint came on regularly for hearing 
pursuant to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of 
the above-entitled Court, on Friday, August 26, 1988, at 8:00 
a.m. Plaintiff, Wayne Burningham, appeared pro se and the 
remaining Defendants did not appear either in person or through 
counsel. The Defendant Surety Life Insurance Company was 
represented by Clark W. Sessions of Sessions and Moore, said 
Defendant's attorneys. The Court heard the arguments and state-
ments of Mr. Burningham and counsel including an explanation as 
to the Plaintiff's failure to secure counsel as earlier ordered 
by the above-entitled Court and being fully advised in the 
premises it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. That the Motion of the Defendant Surety Life Insurance 
Company to Dismiss the above-entitled action as to the Defendant 
Surety Life Insurance Company be and the same is hereby granted, 
and, 
2. That the above-entitled action as to the Defendant 
Surety Life Insurance Company be and the same is hereby 
dismissed. 
DATED this ^ k day of August 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
JSl Pftr'g. "&«,,. 
PAT B. BRIAN r 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 35 day of August, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, first 
class mail, postage prepaid to: 
QL.La-fi/iL 
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Draper RV and Commercial Storage 
Melvin Keith Bumingham 
Wayne Bumingham 
2761 Filmore Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Gregory S. Bell, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendant United Savings 
& Loan Association 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
KEVIN E. ANDERSON (0099) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Surety Life Insurance Company 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DRAPER RV & COMMERCIAL STORAGE 
A Utah Partnership, MELVIN 




SURETY LIFE INSURANCE CO., a 
Utah Corporation, and UNITED : 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
Utah Corporation, ; 
Defendants. ; 
• ORDER 
1 Civil No. C88-564 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
pursuant to notice on the Motion of the Plaintiffs for a 
Preliminary Injunction and related matters. The Plaintiffs were 
represented by Glen W. Park, Esq., their attorney. The Defendant 
Surety Life Insurance Company, a Utah corporation was represented 
by Clark W. Sessions, Esq. of Sessions & Moore, its attorneys, 
and the Defendant United Savings and Loan Association, a Utah 
corporation was represented by David M. Wahlquist, Esq., of 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, said Defendant's attorneys. The 
court heard the evidence adduced and proffered, reviewed the 
exhibits offered and received, the files and records herein and 
the arguments and statements of counsel and after considering the 
various requirements of Rule 65A and the law in such cases made 
and provided and having determined that the Plaintiff's have an 
adequate remedy at law and failed to meet the conditions 
precedent to the granting of a preliminary injunction, 
NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion of the Defendant Surety Life 
Insurance Company, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. That the temporary restraining order heretofore issued 
by the above-entitled Court in the above-captioned matter be and 
the same is hereby dissolved, and, 
2. That the motion of the Plaintiffs for a Preliminary 
Injunction be and the same is hereby denied, and, 
3. That the Defendants shall be granted a period of ten 
days following the entry hereof within which to answer or 
otherwise plead to Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, 
DATED this day of June, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
PAT B. BRIAN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the cP3 day of June, 1988, the 
foregoing ORDER was served on the following parties by mailing a 
true and correct copy thereof, postage prepaid, to: 
Glen W. Park, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
247 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Gregory S. Bell, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorney for Defendant United Savings 
& Loan Association 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
nw.-e4w±, 




Petition for Voluntary Bankruptcy 
Chapter 11 JuL -





DRAPER R.V. & COMMERCIAL STORAGE 
A Utah Partnership 
i.r f 
DO NOT COMPLETE ABOVE 
- FOR COURT USE ONLY • 
38H-Q42AS 
Debtor [include ail names used by debtor within last 6 years] 
Employer's Tax ID No. of debtor: # 8 7 - 0 4 4 4 5 9 5 
VOLUNTARY PETITION — CHAPTER 11 
1. Petitioner's mailing address, including county, is . P. :.Q:. .?p.X. .246 1.. Sandy
 A # Utah. 84091 
#. Sa It # .Lake. .Co u n t y ; 
2. Petitioner has resided [or has had its domicile or principal place of business or has had its principal 
assets] within this district for the longer portion of the preceding 180 days than in any other district. 
3. Petitioner is qualified to file this petition and is entitled to the benefits of title 11, United States Code as 
a voluntary debtor. 
4. Petitioner intends to file a plan under Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Code. 
5. Exhibt "A" is attached to and made part of this petition. 
7
 'uj Signed Attorney.In Fact 
lAtto^y for Petitioner) A p p e a r i n g PrO-$£ 
Acuta:...1.396..E.,..51I.Y.ejccr.e.s.t..Dr., 
Sandy.,...Utah...8.4Q9.3 
Unsworn Declaration under Penalty of Perjury on Behalf of a Corporation or Partnership 
I, . . .Wa y n e . . J . . . . B u X J l i ng.h.aJD [the president or other officer or an authorized 
agent of the corporation! [or a member or an authorized agent of the partnership! named as petitioner in the foregoing petition, declare under penalty 
of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, and that the filing of this petition on behalf of the [corporation! [or partnership! has been authorized. 
Executed on 7.7.? 2 - J. 9 8 8 Signature 
TT?I VXTKXR l/MUCl Of TO W T O i n T XKIOM IMS AID ATOUIS WXTlUTj ° ^ 
Y7ID LXHM CXHTtUd XI I B KXB0L1 Of UCI HACl. ttUTT ALL ASDKISStt. 
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DRAPER RV & COMMERCIAL 
STORAGE 
P.O.BOX 2461 Sandy Ut 
84091 
M M — — * * — * — — M i l 
WAYNE BURNINGHAM 
1396 E. Silvercrest Dr. 
Sandy, Ut. 84093 
Attorney In Fact, ProSe 
mm^mmmm^mmmmi tomm——mm6 
P.S» TSUSTBS CfTICE 
K N O T IBEML BUILDING 
225 SCOT STMZ HDM 4218 
ALT LME Cm, UDH 84138 
Surety Life Insurance 
A l l s t a t e I n s . Plaza E-2 
Northbrook, 111. 60062 
un i ted Savings 
376 E. 4th So. 
SLC, U t . 84111 
& Loan 
Howard Hucks 
3463 State St. #313 
Santa Barbara Ca. 93105 
Phyllis Stokes 
2588-D El Camino Real 
0270 Carlesbad, Ca. 
32008 
Verification on Behalf of a Corporation 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah 
Division 
In re 
i Case No 
Debtor \ 
[include here all names used by debtor within last 6 years) ' 
Tax Identification No. 
I, , the president [or other officer or an authorized agent] of the corporation 
named as petitioner in the foregoing petition, certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 
and correct, and that the filing of this petition on behalf of the corporation has been authorized. 
Executed on 
Verification on Behalf of a Partnership 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah 
Division 
In re 
DRAPER R.V . & COMMERCIAL STORAGE 
A Utah P a r t n e r s h i p , Bankruptcy No. 
Debtor J 
[include here all names used by debtor within last 6 yean) I 
Tax Identification No. 87-0444595 
I, Wayne Burningham
 a member [or an authorized agent] of the partnership named as peti-
tioner in the foregoing petition, certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, 
and that the filing of this petition on behalf of the partnership has been authorized. 
Executed on / ~ 21- ?~f* 
Tab 7 
DRAPER R.V. & C O M M E K C I A L STORAGE 
Wayne Burningham - Attorney In Fact 
Appearing Pro-Se 
1396 E. Silvercrest Dr. 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
(801) 571-3025 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
In Re; 
DRAPER R.V. & COMMERCIAL STORAGE; 
Petitioner 
Vs. 
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE 
MOTION FOR HEARING ON ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE 
C 
Case No. 88-4245 
Judge GLEN E. CLARK 
COMES NOW the petitioner who moves the Court for an Order To 
Show Cause in the above-entitled action. 
This Motion is based upon the fact that the Petitioner filed 
a Petition For Voluntary Bankruptcy Chapter 11 in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court, District Of Utah, Central Division on July 26, 
11:50 AM, 1988, Mr. Clark Sessions, attorney for Surety Life 
Insurance was notified both by ohone and hand delivery of a copy 
of the petition. Mr. Sessions of Sessions And Moore continued with 
and conducted a Trustee Sale of the Property on July 27, 1988 at 
10:00 AM in violation of an Automatic Stay. Petitioner therefore 
requests a hearing be set in this matter and an Order Staying 
Surety Life from executing on its Order To Vacate and taking pos-
ession of the property be issued pending the hearing. 
DATED this 2£?L day of July, 1988. 
i/>yL^_ J^ 
Tab 8 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (5050) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Surety Life 
Insurance Co. 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)359-4100 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
In Re: 
DRAPER R.V. & COMMERCIAL 
STORAGE, a Utah 
partnership, 
Debtor. 
Case No. 88C-04245 
(Chapter 11) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Motion of Surety Life Insurance Company for relief from 
the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 came on regular-
ly for hearing pursuant to notice before the Honorable Glen E. 
Clark, United States Bankruptcy Judge, on Thursday, December 8, 
1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. and continued thereafter on 
Monday, December 12, 1988 at 9:00 a.m. The Debtor was 
represented by J. Douglas Kinateder, Debtor's attorney, and 
Surety Life Insurance Company was represented by Clark W. 
Sessions and Cynthia K. Cassell of Sessions & Moore, its 
attorneys. 
The Court having heard and considered the testimony of the 
witnesses and the evidence offered and received, and having heard 
and considered the arguments and statements of counsel, and being 
fully advised in the premises, makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The property located at 12700 South State Street, 
Draper, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 10, BURNINGHAM INDUSTRIAL SUBDIVISION 
PHASE 2, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in Book 85-11 of the Plats 
at Page 192, records of Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
Less and excepting therefrom the Easterly 30 
feet of the Southerly 415.84 feet thereof. 
Together with a Right of Way over the follow-
ing tract of land. 
Beginning at a point South 89°48,40ff East 
along the section line 837.23 feet and North 
95.37 feet from the Southwest corner of 
Section 30, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence West 240.23 feet; thence North 33.73 
feet; thence West 364.67 feet to the East 
line of a frontage road at a point North 
126.34 feet and East 232.33 feet from the 
aforesaid Southwest section corner, thence 
South 5°26f West 60.27 feet; thence East 
370.38 feet to a P.C. of a curve to the 
right, thence along the arc of said curve 
25.09 feet to a P.R.C. center bearing South 
8°32f West; thence along a curve to the left 
25.09 feet to the P.T.; thence East 190.23 
feet; thence North 30.0 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
TJA^ . Q_I o n 9 
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Together with a Right of Way over the follow-
ing: 
Beginning at a point which is South 89°48!40" 
East 837.23 feet and North 65.37 feet from 
the Southwest corner of Section 30, Township 
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; and running thence South 18.87 
feet; thence North 86°47f18M West 21.17 feet; 
thence North 75°00!45" West 25.77 feet; 
thence North 83°15t22,f West 58.09 feet; 
thence North 84°10'28M West 29.87 feet; 
thence North 88038'58,! West 26.56 feet; 
thence North 82°27f50,f West 4.14 feet; thence 
East 164.09 feet to the point of beginning. 
is not property of the estate. 
2. As of the date Debtor filed its petition in bankruptcy 
(July 26, 1988) and as of the date Surety proceeded with 
Trusteee's Sale (July 27, 1988), Debtor did not have a legal 
interest in the Property, but did have a possessory interest in 
the Property and Surety was thus required to move for relief from 
the stay. 
3. The Debtor was in possession of the Property as of the 
date of the hearing on Surety's motion for relief from stay. 
4. The value of the Property is $700,000.00. 
5. The obligation owed to Surety Life Insurance Company 
which is secured by a Deed of Trust on the Property totals 
approximately $1,000,000.00. 
6. The owners of the Property have no equity in the 
Property. 
7. The Debtor has not met its burden of proof with regard 
to its ability to effect a reorganization. 
TJC O . C 1 O / 1 O 
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8. The Court makes no finding as to bad faith on the part 
of the Debtor. 
From the foregoing findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Since the Property is not property of the estate, 
Surety is entitled to relief from the Stay. 
2. That the Court should make and enter its Order 
accordingly. 
DATED this day of , 198 . 
BY THE COURT: 
GLEN E. CLARK 




ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the //*( day of >^^/-s , 1989, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand-delivered to: 
J. Douglas Kinateder, Esq. 
Attorney for Debtor 
20A0 East 4800 South 
Suite 112 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of , 
1989, true and correct copies of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW were mailed by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Cynthia K. Cassell, Esq. 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Surety Life 
Insurance Co. 
505 East 200 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
J. Douglas Kinateder, Esq. 
Attorney for Debtor 
2040 East 4800 South 
Suite 112 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
-5-
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (5050) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Surety Life 
Insurance Co. 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
IN RE: 
DRAPER R.V. & COMMERCIAL : 
STORAGE, a Utah j 
partnership, ! 
Debtor. : 
; Case No. 88C-04245 
: (Chapter 11) 
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF 
i FROM STAY 
The Motion of Surety Life Insurance Company for relief from 
the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 came on regular-
ly for hearing pursuant to notice before the Honorable Glen E. 
Clark, United States Bankruptcy Judge, on Thursday, December 8, 
1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. and continued thereafter on 
Monday, December 12, 1988, at 9:00 a.m. The Debtor was repre-
sented by J. Douglas Kinateder, Debtorfs attorney, and Surety 
Life Insurance Company was represented by Clark W. Sessions and 
Cynthia K. Cassell of Sessions & Moore, its attorneys. 
The Court heard and considered the sworn testimony of 
witnesses called, considered evidence offered and received, heard 
and considered the arguments and statements of counsel and after 
having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and being fully advised in the premises, hereby ORDERS AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. That the Motion of Surety Life Insurance Company for 
relief from the Automatic Stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 be 
and the same is hereby granted, and, 
2. That the Automatic Stay heretofore in effect with 
respect to the Debtor and its possessory interest in and to 
certain real property and improvements thereon located at 12700 
South State Street, Draper, Utah and more particularly described 
as follows: 
Lot 10, BURNINGHAM INDUSTRIAL SUBDIVISION 
PHASE 2, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in Book 85-11 of the Plats 
at Page 192, records of Salt Lake Countv, 
Utah. 
Less and excepting therefrom the Easterly 30 
feet of the Southerly 415.84 feet thereof. 
Together with a Right of Way over the follow-
ing tract of land. 
Beginning at a point South 89°48t40ff East 
along the section line 837.23 feet and North 
95.37 feet from the Southwest corner of 
Section 30, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence West 240.23 feet; thence North 33.73 
feet; thence West 364.67 feet to the East 
line of a frontage road at a point North 
126.34 feet and East 232.33 feet from the 
aforesaid Southwest section corner, thence 
South 5°26f West 60.27 feet; thence East 
-2-
370.38 feet to a P.C. of a curve to the 
right, thence along the arc of said curve 
25.09 feet to a P.R.C. center bearing South 
8°32' West; thence along a curve to the left 
25.09 feet to the P.T. ; thence East 190.23 
feet; thence North 30.0 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Together with a Right of Way over the follow-
ing: 
Beginning at a point which is South 89°48'40" 
East 837.23 feet and North 65.37 feet from 
the Southwest corner of Section 30, Township 
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; and running thence South 18.87 
feet; thence North 86047'18" West 21.17 feet; 
thence North 75°00'45" West 25.77 feet; 
thence North 83°15,22M West 58.09 feet; 
thence North 84°10,28" West 29.87 feet; 
thence North 88°38'58" West 26.56 feet; 
thence North 82°27'50" West 4.14 feet; thence 
East 164.09 feet to the point of beginning. 
be and the same is hereby dissolved and terminated in order to 
permit the eviction of the Debtor from said Property. 
IW 
DATED this day of Peieuibec, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. DOWGLAS KINATEDER 
Attorney for Debtor 
GLEN E. CLARK 
Bankruptcy Judge 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
Attorney for Surety 
Life Insurance Company 
Tab 9 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CLARK L. SNELSON (4673) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
a Utah corporation, : RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
: TO DISMISS APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Respondent, : 
vs. : 
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, HOWARD H. : Case No. 890594-CA 
HUCKS, MARKWEST CORPORATION, : 
a California corporation, : 
and JOHN DOES I-X, : Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Defendants and Appellants. : 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and Respondent, Surety Life Insurance 
Company ("Respondent"), by and through its undersigned counsel, and 
moves that the Appeal filed in the above-referenced case be 
dismissed for failure to comply with Rules 3, 6, 9(a), 11(e)(1), 
and 11(e)(4) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Respondent 
also seeks to dismiss the Appeal pursuant to Rule 10(a)(2) and 
seeks its costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. Respondent 
relies on Utah Supreme Court Rules 21, 34, and those above-cited, 
as well as the accompanying Memorandum and Affidavit. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of October, 1989 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1092-80L.PL3 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the £V^day of October, 1989, the 
foregoing RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL was served on 
Defendants/Appellants by hand-delivering a true and correct copy 
thereof to: 
J. Douglas Kinateder, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 112 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CLARK L. SNELSON (4673) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, HOWARD H. 
HUCKS, MARKWEST CORPORATION, 
a California corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS APPEAL 
Case No. 890594-CA 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and Respondent, Surety Life Insurance 
Company ("Respondent"), by and through its undersigned counsel, and 
submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to 
Dismiss this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 12, 1989, Judge Raymond S. Uno signed an Order denying 
Defendant Howard K. Hucks and Markwest Corporation's Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment and denying the Motion of Melvin K. 
Burningham to vacate or set aside summary judgment. 
Defendants filed with the Utah Supreme Court a Notice of 
Appeal dated June 15, 1989. On August 14, 1989, the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court, Geoffrey J. Butler, sent notice to Appellants' 
counsel that the record in the case had not been filed, nor had a 
transcript been ordered and paid for pursuant to Rule 11 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Appellants' counsel was advised 
that failure to comply within ten days would result in dismissal 
for failure to promptly pursue the appeal. By letter dated August 
23, 1989, the Clerk of the Supreme Court sent notice to Appellants 
that they were in default of Rule 9(a) which requires filing of a 
Docketing Statement within 21 days of the filing of a Notice of 
Appeal. Again, notice was given that failure to cure the default 
within 10 days would result in dismissal of the appeal. On 
September 12, 1989, Appellants were notified that their Docketing 
Statement, filed nearly 3 months after their Notice of Appeal, was 
deficient, and were given notice that failure to file an Amended 
Docketing Statement correcting these deficiencies within 10 days 
would result in dismissal of the appeal. 
By letter dated October 6, 1989, Appellants were notified by 
the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals that they were in default 
for failure to file a Bond on Appeal and were asked to cure such 
default immediately. 
1092-80M.PL3 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Appellants have failed to comply with Rules 3, 6, 9(a), 
11(e)(1), and 11(e)(4) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
and have failed on four separate occasions to heed the warning of 
the Court that failure to cure these defaults would result in 
dismissal of the appeal. 
Rule 3(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court states: "The 
party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a Notice 
of Appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to 
counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order. . . . 
Counsel for Respondent has not received a copy of the Notice of 
Appeal, nor have they received a copy of any other pleading filed 
by Appellants in the above-referenced case. Respondent's first 
notice that an appeal had been filed came nearly three months after 
filing of the Notice of Appeal when counsel received a copy of the 
notice sent by the Supreme Court that the case had been transferred 
to the Court of Appeals. (See Affidavit of Clark Snelson, attached 
hereto and incorporated by this reference herein.) 
Rule 11(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court states that 
"within ten (10) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, 
Appellant shall request from the reporter a transcript. . . . The 
request shall in writing and filed with the Clerk of the District 
Court." Appellants have failed as of the date of this Memorandum 
to carry out their duty to see that the record is transcribed and 
1092-80M.PL3 3 
transmitted to the court. This has delayed, and continues to 
delay, the briefing schedule and disposition < the appeal. 
Despite the Court's notice that failure to comply with this Rul e 
w o u l d r e s u l t i n djLsmi.ssai of the appeal, Appellants have failed to 
comply. 
Not only did Appellants fail to file a Docketing Statement 
with I i :i 2 ] day s as ;i • rr:: red by Rule 9 , but they have failed to 
comply with the Court 3 warning that failure to do so within ten 
days would result i11 dismissal of the appeal. Likewise, upon 
fI ] 1 ng 1: £ the Docketi ng Statemen iq after the expi ra ti on of the 
10-day grace period granted by tl i,e i!oiut., Appellants were again 
notified that t/H- Docketing Statement was deficient, and that such 
defici rected wi th i n ] 0 days ::)i: tl 1 a t the appea II 
would be dismissed. As of the date of the filing of th Is 
Memorandum, there is no Amended Docketing Statement on file with 
t h e C o u r t . Fin t hi'Litiui e , App* 1 ! I m i t * tdiilure In ,i< 1 \n n/up 1 i> \k- nt 
their Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement upon counsel for 
Respondent deprived Respondent of the opportunity tc rile ,i "notion 
piirR 1.1 a n l 1 r in 11» 1111 II 1« I (1 ( r 1 |i 1 ;' |i t 11 d i srai s s tor f a 1 J111 r e : . J , 
on appeal of sufficient merit to justify consideration by the 
Court. Respondent seeks leave of the Court to file such a motion 
fif H ' ci,:i s r a i s s a 1 1 111 I h e 
instant motion. 
1092-80M.PL3 4 
A p p e 11 an \ s 'hia"/- • * a I ! PC;I 1 '" J » OIUJ. > I ":' u i-11 «-t i»v, f- t i n - t u I H S 
governing filing of appeals In the instant case; they have failed 
to request a transcript within 10 days as required by Rule 1 1 , and 
as yet: ii frarisn nil I'M . mil b o o n f I 1 P«1 ; 1 hpy h a v p trnlf1*! I;,«» fi ] e 
a Docketing Statement within 21 days as required by Rule 9, and as 
yet there is no adequate Docketing Statement on fi]e; they have 
fail eci to fi ] e a Boi id as reqi i I i: e d by Ri :i Il 6 • 6 a i i I a s ] $ <= 1 : i i 
been filed; they have filed to serve Notice u Appeal on opposing 
counsel as required by Rule u>d in * <^?t * ,ive failed *r serve 
Supreme 
Court of Appeals upon opposing counsel, Respondent's Motion is 
based on more than a single technical failure to comply with the 
R u l e s . It i i|i outncli »< I u p o n d g e n e r a l il i s u?cj<ini lui Ih*1 b'mlkvi nt 
Appellate Procedure manifest by Appellants in this case While 
dismissal for failure to comply with the above-referenced rules is 
ill HCi etionai'Y w i t h t ho 'Vu'i , iHequd*.e ijii'iii'lw exi.-1 ,l ' «lihiiiihs 
this appeal, See Rule 9(f); see also Mountain States Telegraph & 
Telephone Co, v. Atkins, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 
(Utah |i»oi < «"> ,| ,,I||IV d i s m i s s lui lijiluio tu lilo mi II i Il on 
appeal • 10(a)(2) (failure to state grounds for appeal 
sufficient to meri t review of the Cou rt j 
Respondent.!. pi: e j u d i c u d by" Ap|>e I lam!! b " f <n I u n j s 
Failure to notify Respondent of the Notice of Appeal has misled 
Respondent into believing that the matter was final and that no 
1092-80M.PL3 5 
further legal action or ] egaJ costs would be required, Failure to 
file a timely and adequate Docketing Statement and to serve a copy 
thereon on Respondent deprived Respondent of the opportunity to 
challenge the sufficiency of the a I 1 eqaf/ei ens 01 1 appea ] and tc have 
the appeal dismissed on that ground months, prior to the f i 1 1 ng of 
this Motion. The delay in filing request for records and in other 
filings made by Appe3 ] ai 1 1::s 1 la v e :ie] ayed ai id c :>:i i t:i ni le tc del ay the 
determination of this action. 
Dismissal of the appeal is appropriate not just for the 
prejudice si if fered bj Respoi idei its
 |( I: i i I: because Appel 1 ants act , • -
have demonstrated total disregard not only for the procedures of 
the Court but. for its power. On four separate occasions, 
A p p e 1 1 1\ n t" s w * e e 11 ie > <-» 11 n u t e e m l \ I H • i i f a i I u i i • i 11 i i iiiii 111 | a n d j i v \ * 11 
an opportunity to cure their defaults, with the warning that 
failure to do so would result in dismissal of the appeal , Yet ., i n 
each instance , AppeJ I rent s h<e/e e i 1 hei f «J L J ed omp] y wi t::„l i the 
Court's requirements in a timely fashion r r.o comply at all. Such 
actions show contempt for the Court, and its procedures and should 
not . ., . f u 
practices r»t- .v.ir: undermines ^ respect and authority. 
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent respectfully requests 
t licit tins appea I IIM *\ \,( en sseil n^«i llhi' i^ s^poiiiienl. IHJ dwditle«i| its 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in bringing this Motion. 
1092-80M.PL3 6 
P Y day oJ RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this y   of October, 1989. 
SESSIONS h MUUNK 
1092-80M.PL3 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the XV"4i day of October, J 9 89, the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
APPEAL was served <vi Defendants/Appellants by hand-delivering a 
true and correct
 COpy thereof to: 
JB Douglas Kinateder, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 1]2 




IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
onl) 10 
Surety Life Insurance Company, I 
a Utah corporator 1 
) NOTICE OF STATUS 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) CONFERENCE 
) 
v. Case No. 890594-CA 
Melvin K. Burninaham, Markwest 
Corporation, a California / 
corporation, and John Does ) 
I-X, ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
This matter is before the court on its own motion pursuant 
to R. Utah Ct. App. 28. On December 20, 1989, appellant Melvin 
Keith Burningham filed a Reply to Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal, which represents that appellant has filed a 
Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy. 
United States Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) imposes an automatic 
stay as of the filing of any bankruptcy petition. To date, 
this court has received no further information regarding the 
bankruptcy. 
The parties to the appeal are hereby requested to appear it 
a conference before the Honorable Richard C. Davidson in his 
chambers at 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
at 1:30 p.m. on January 24, 1990, to inform the court of the 
status of the bankruptcy and pending appeal. 
DATED this T day ot January, 1990. 
I i ii i HI rniiu r• 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of January, 1990, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE 
was deposited in the United States mail. 
J. Douglas Kinateder 
Attorney at Law 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 112 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Clark W. Sessions 
Sessions & Moore 
Attorneys at Law 
404 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
DATED this 9th day of January, 1990. 




F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Surety Life Insurance Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Melvin K Burningham, Markwest 
Corporation, a California 
corporation, and John Does I-X, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
— -FEB_2 61391 
NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE 
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT 
FOR SIJMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No, 890594-CA 
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
The above-captioned appeal is being considered •> summary 
d i s m i s s a II \ 11 I < :1 e r R 1 J t a 1 I CI I \ p p . 1 0 (€ •) lb e c a u s e 
moot as a result of defendant's discharge w bankruptcy. In 
lieu of -» brief, you are requested to f j " - * memorandum, not to 
exceeo pages, explai ni ng why the appeal shou 1 d • :>i: sI io\ I] d i iot 
be dismissed as moot. 
A n originai an(j four copies of the memorandum should be 
filed with the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before 
Monday, March 11, 1991. 
DATED this 25th day of February, 1991 
•\/-\ v> ~\ r% ^***m Mary T/ Noonan 
ClerKv/utah Court of Appeals 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of February, 1991, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE 
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